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WHY DONALD TRUMP IS NOT ANDREW JACKSON 
(AND WHY THAT MATTERS FOR AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY) 
ERIC LOMAZOFF 
In mid-February 2017, the Associated Press published a piece by Jona-
than Lemire that ran in numerous online outlets: “Trump election has paral-
lels to Andrew Jackson’s presidency.”1  Lemire suggested that Trump, like 
Jackson, was an “unvarnished celebrity outsider” who prevailed in an “ugly, 
highly personal presidential election” over a “member of the Washington es-
tablishment looking to extend a political dynasty in the White House” by 
pledging “to represent the forgotten laborer.”2  To burnish the case for his 
exercise, Lemire added that Steve BannonTrump’s then-chief strate-
gisthas “pushed the comparison,” and the president “has hung a portrait of 
Jackson in the Oval Office.”3 
None of these similarities between Trump and Jackson strike me as mat-
ters of obvious consequence for thinking about the short or long-term health 
of American constitutional democracy.  “Outsiders” such as Ulysses Grant 
and Dwight Eisenhower have been elected to the presidency and completed 
their terms without incident.  Incumbents such as Thomas Jefferson and 
Rutherford B. Hayes successfully governed following “highly personal” con-
tests.4  Grover Cleveland defeated the grandson of a former president (who 
was occupying the Oval Office himself at the time), but that does not appear 
to have inhibited his ability to lead the executive branch responsibly.  Finally, 
Ronald Reagan demonstrated that successful appeals to working-class voters 
are not always followed by severe constitutional stress. 
                                                          
© 2017 Eric Lomazoff. 
 Assistant Professor of Political Science, Villanova University.  An earlier version of this 
essay was presented at the 2017 annual meeting of the Maryland Discussion Group on Constitution-
alism (a.k.a., the “Maryland Constitutional Law Schmooze”), March 2–3, University of Maryland 
School of Law. 
 1.  Jonathan Lemire, Trump Election Has Parallels to Andrew Jackson’s Presidency, AP 
NEWS (Feb. 20, 2017), https://apnews.com/dc620710242649989b4fa1380986166d.  
 2.  Id.  Jackson’s opponent in the 1828 election, of course, was incumbent president John 
Quincy Adams, son of the second president. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  For a short and readable take on the Hayes-Tilden contest, see Gilbert King, The Ugliest, 
Most Contentious Presidential Election Ever, SMITHSONIAN.COM (Sept. 7, 2012), 
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-ugliest-most-contentious-presidential-election-ever-
28429530/?no-ist. 
 2017] WHY DONALD TRUMP IS NOT ANDREW JACKSON 281 
 
Something in Lemire’s piece did strike me as having constitutional im-
port, however.  He quoted Jon Meacham, author of a Pulitzer Prize-winning 
biography of our seventh president: “The moment is Jacksonian[,] but do we 
have a Jackson in the Oval Office?”5  The function of employing Meacham 
here, of course, was to ask how far the similarities between Jackson and 
Trump will ultimately run.  Will the latter, for examplein a moment of deep 
disdain for the substantive outcomes produced by the modern administrative 
statechallenge the Federal Reserve’s relative independence in making 
monetary policy in the same way that the former challenged the Second 
Bank’s comparable autonomy in the same policy realm?6 
I was not struck, however, by the function of the Meacham quote within 
Lemire’s piece.  I was struck by Meacham’s characterization of the current 
moment as “Jacksonian.”  To liken Trump to a latter-day Jackson is simply 
not the same thing (at least to my mind) as suggesting that Trump is govern-
ing in a Jacksonian moment; while the former focuses on individual traits, 
the latter describes environmental qualities.  Otherwise put (to borrow from 
Stephen Skowronek), Meacham was describing Trump’s “governing envi-
ronment.”7 
Explaining how presidential incumbents behaveor what “leadership 
posture[s]” they adoptin different governing environments is the central 
task of Skowronek’s The Politics Presidents Make.8  As such, Meacham’s 
suggestion that Trump is governing in a Jacksonian moment led me to ask a 
series of nested questions: (1) For Skowronek, which features of a governing 
environment predict the type of leadership posture that a president will 
adopt?  (2) Given his own governing environment, what type of posture did 
Andrew Jackson adopt?  (3) Is Donald Trump operating in a comparable gov-
erning environment?  (If so, then Meacham’s characterization of the current 
moment is apt.)  (4) If not, then in what type of environment is Trump oper-
ating, and what leadership postures have similarly situated incumbents 
adopted?  Finally, and most importantly, (5) What is the constitutional import 
                                                          
 5.  Lemire, supra note 1 (quoting JON MEACHAM, AMERICAN LION: ANDREW JACKSON IN 
THE WHITE HOUSE (2009)). 
 6.  The decision in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) notwithstand-
ing, if the Harvard Law Review agreed to publish an article almost sixty years later that opened by 
claiming that the modern “administrative state is unconstitutional, and its validation by the legal 
system amounts to nothing less than a bloodless constitutional revolution[,]” then we would be wise 
not to dismiss the possibility of a future challenge by President Trump to the Federal Reserve’s 
independence (in a moment of frustration with its monetary choices and/or their consequences).  
Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1994) 
(footnote omitted).  
 7.  STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN 
ADAMS TO BILL CLINTON 367–68 (1997). 
 8.  Id. at 121, 212–15, 382–85. 
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of discerning (or at least venturing an educated guess as to) Trump’s leader-
ship posture?  That is to say, what does all of this tell us about Trump’s vision 
of American constitutional democracy, and how other actors are likely to re-
spond to that vision? 
As the title of this short Essay suggests, I am not at all convinced that 
Donald Trump is governing in a Jacksonian moment.  All told, I think that 
conclusion bodes well for the short-term health of American constitutional 
democracy, but it also threatens to exacerbate a longer-term problem. 
* * * 
On the assumption that students of American politics are increasingly 
familiar with Skowronek’s explanation for variation in presidential leader-
ship,9 I will not offer this point extended treatment.  In brief, Skowronek sees 
governing environmentshis term of art here is “political time”as shaped 
by (1) the strength of the dominant governing coalition or “regime” (i.e., it is 
weak or strong), and (2) the incumbent’s relationship to that regime (i.e., he 
is affiliated with it, or not).10  Presidents thus govern in one of four environ-
ments, or moments in “political time,” with incumbents in each of the four 
adopting a distinct leadership posture.11  These four leadership postures, or 
the types of “politics that presidents make,” are enumerated in the table be-
low. 
  
                                                          
 9.  One participant in this year’s “Schmooze” has even labored to make sense of periodic de-
partmentalist thinking by presidents with that explanation in mind.  See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, 
POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY xi (2007). 
 10.  SKOWRONEK, supra note 7, at 30, 34–36. 
 11.  Id. at 34. 
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12 
An assessment of Andrew Jackson’s governing environment, and result-
ing leadership posture, can be equally brief.  “Old Hickory” is one of the few 
presidents in American history who ascended to power “in opposition to [a] 
weak regime[].”13  Jackson took his election in 1828 not simply as personal 
vindication for 1824 (when he won a plurality of the popular vote but ulti-
mately lost to John Quincy Adams in the House), but as evidence that the 
American people had authorized him to fundamentally change the way that 
business was doneand had long been donein the nation’s capital.  Adopt-
ing a “reconstructive” leadership posture, Jackson not only “reversed the ide-
ological thrust of the national government” (i.e., embraced a less robust con-
ception of Congress’ powers than his predecessors), but also “transformed 
the operating mores of American government” by (among other things) in-
troducing significant change in how the bureaucracy was staffed.14 
This brings us to the crux of my interest in the Meacham quote: is 
Trump, like Jackson, unaffiliated with a weak regime?  Are the conditions 
ripe for the 45th president to engage in Skowronek’s “politics of reconstruc-
tion”? 
Categorizing the current incumbent using Skowronek’s framework has 
always struck me as American Political Development’s version of a parlor 
game: logical and at least mildly amusing, yet frequently devoid of a clear 
end-point.  In years past, after introducing the framework, I would invite un-
dergraduates to “play” using Barack Obama.  Invariably, debate would turn 
not on Obama’s relationship to the dominant governing coalitionall agreed 
that he was unaffiliated with the “Conservative” regime, irrespective of 
whether its reign began with Nixon’s election in 1968 or Reagan’s in 
1980but the strength of that regime.  If the organizing principles of late 
twentieth and early twenty-first-century American politicsand I would 
                                                          
 12.  Id. at 36 tbl.1. 
 13.  WHITTINGTON, supra note 9, at 50. 
 14.  SKOWRONEK, supra note 7, at 133.  For a comparable take on Jackson as the founder of a 
“generational regime,” see GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
THE RISE AND FALL OF GENERATIONAL REGIMES (2007). 
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sometimes volunteer a working list consisting of reinvigorated federalism, 
structural budget deficits, constitutionalized culture wars, and both profes-
sionalization and polarization within Congressremained strong, then 
Obama ought to be characterized as a “preemptive” leader.  His periodic will-
ingness to criticize the Supreme Court (recall the State of the Union address 
in which he criticized Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission15 to 
the chagrin of Justice Alito), but not to challenge its supremacy in constitu-
tional interpretation, certainly did not militate against this characterization.16  
If those same organizing principles, by contrast, were weakand liberal stu-
dents, quickly sensing how the parlor game was played, were more inclined 
toward this viewthen there was room to argue that Obama was a recon-
structive leader in the tradition of Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, FDR, and 
Reagan. 
This version of the game, however, was probably a faulty oneand that 
has significant implications for how we construe Trump’s governing envi-
ronment, his resulting leadership posture, and (most importantly) his rela-
tionship to the constitutional order.  In short, I erred in failing to acknowledge 
a complicating factor within the game: Skowronek’s suggestion that over 
time, we have seen a “progressive proliferation of organized interests and 
independent authorities” within American politics.17  This “thickening of the 
institutional universe” has made it harder for all presidents, even those “who 
hold the most compelling warrants” for action, to offer a frontal challenge to 
the status quo in Washington.18  In simpler terms, modern presidents are en-
countering a Washington that is increasingly immune to attempts to funda-
mentally disrupt its way of doing things.   
So, what is the upshot of this for analyzing a twenty-first-century presi-
dent’s leadership prospects?  More and more of them will adopt a preemptive 
leadership posture, less because they are unaffiliated with the ideological 
commitments of a strong governing coalition (think of Bill Clinton pitted 
against post-1994 Republican majorities) and more because they are unaffil-
iated (or present themselves as unaffiliated) with the ever-strengthening po-
litical culture of the nation’s capital.  As such, a better conceived game would 
have led my students to conclude that Obama was a preemptive leader, less 
for the strength of the Conservative regime in January 2009, and more for his 
                                                          
 15.  558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 16.  On preemptive presidents as unlikely to challenge the Court’s interpretive supremacy, see 
WHITTINGTON, supra note 9, at 161–229. 
 17.  SKOWRONEK, supra note 7, at 31. 
 18.  Id. 
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Inauguration Day desire to challenge the notion that “our system cannot tol-
erate too many big plans.”19 
So, let’s play both versions of the parlor game with Trump.  Under the 
first version, we evaluate the 45th president in the same way that my students 
were asked to evaluate the 44thby asking about the strength of the Con-
servative regime and the incumbent’s relationship to it.  Oft-repeated misgiv-
ings about President Trump’s conservatism notwithstanding,20 he has openly 
compared himself to Reagan,21 pursued and won the presidential nomination 
of the Republican Party, and nominated a lifelong conservative to the Su-
preme Court.  It would be difficult, on this basis, to conclude that Trump is 
anything but an affiliated leader.  (Such leaders, Skowronek reminds us, fre-
quently inspire heated disputes over what it means to be a “faithful” follower 
of the regime’s founder.)22  Trump’s leadership posture would then turn on 
the strength of the Conservative regime: “orthodox-innovative” if it were 
strong, “disjunctive” if it were weak.  And I imagine that judgments on this 
question might turn on how much the judge wants a generation-defining 
Democratic landslide in 2020. 
Under the second versionthe version that acknowledges a “thickening 
of the institutional universe”23 over time—we also evaluate the 45th president 
by asking about the strength of the current regime and his relationship to it.  
This time, however, the “regime” is defined less by a combination of consti-
tutional, fiscal, and social conservatism and more by the range of “interests 
and authorities” that have developed within the federal government and the 
“organizational resilience of the institutions that defend them.”24  As with the 
first version, let’s begin with Trump’s relationship to the regime.  If there is 
a case to be made that Trump is affiliated with the Conservative regime, then 
there is an even stronger case to be made that he is unaffiliated with Wash-
ington’s well-established “institutional universe.”  To run (and win) as a stri-
dently “anti-establishment” candidate is to promise an oppositional leader-
ship posture. 
                                                          
 19.  Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009) (transcript available at 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-2009-book1/pdf/PPP-2009-book1-Doc-pg1.pdf). 
 20.  For an early expression of anxiety, see Peter Wehner, Donald Trump Is Many Things.  Con-
servative Isn’t One of Them, COMMENTARY (Aug. 20, 2015), https://www.commentarymaga-
zine.com/politics-ideas/campaigns-elections/donald-trump-not-conservative/. 
 21.  Nick Gass, Trump Defends Himself: I’m a Conservative, POLITICO (Aug. 20, 2015), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/08/donald-trump-im-a-conservative-jeb-bush-121554. 
 22.  For a discussion of George H.W. Bush along these lines, see SKOWRONEK, supra note 7, 
at 429–42. 
 23.  See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 24.  SKOWRONEK, supra note 7, at 443. 
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Setting aside the obvious problem hereone account of “regime” leads 
to the conclusion that Trump is an affiliated leader, and another to the oppo-
site conclusionlet’s turn to the question of which of the two leadership pos-
tures (reconstruction or preemption) he would occupy qua unaffiliated in-
cumbent.  As with the first version of the game, the answer turns on whether 
the regime in question is strong or weak.  On the one hand, Trump is talking 
and acting as if the regime is weak, or certainly vulnerable to a significant 
assault.  Having your chief strategist push a comparison with a reconstructive 
leader, and hanging a portrait of said leader in your office, sends a powerful 
message about how the 45th president sees himself.  Moreover, departmen-
talist thinking and behavior with respect to constitutional interpretationof 
which there has been more than a hint in both Trump’s tweets25 and the lan-
guage of his Senior Policy Advisor26has historically been a feature (as 
Keith Whittington has shown) of reconstructive leadership alone.27 
On the other hand, there are two (related) reasons to doubt Trump’s ap-
parent conclusion that our “institutional universe” is weak.  First, reconstruc-
tive leaders tend to assume power following a decisive electoral triumph.  
Think here of Jefferson in 1800 (the ensuing shenanigans with Aaron Burr 
notwithstanding), Jackson in 1828, Lincoln in 1860, FDR in 1932, and 
Reagan in 1980.28  Trump’s electoral victory, by contrast, did not even in-
clude a triumph in the national popular vote.  It is worth noting that no simi-
larly situated incumbentJohn Quincy Adams, Rutherford B. Hayes, Ben-
jamin Harrison, or George W. Bushadopted a reconstructive leadership 
                                                          
 25.  I refer here, of course, to his labeling of federal judge James Robartauthor of the tempo-
rary restraining order with respect to the executive order on immigrationas a “so-called judge[.]”  
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017, 5:12 AM), https://twitter.com/real-
donaldtrump/status/827867311054974976?lang=en.  
 26.  Appearing on NBC’s Meet the Press on February 12, three days after a panel of three 
judges on the Ninth Circuit unanimously refused to reinstate the executive order on immigration, 
Stephen Miller suggested, “we’ve heard a lot of talk about how all the branches of government are 
equal.  That’s the point: they are equal.  There’s no such thing as judicial supremacy.”  Full Miller 
Interview: ‘There’s No Such Thing as Judicial Supremacy’, MEET THE PRESS (NBC television 
broadcast Feb. 12, 2017), http://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/video/full-miller-interview-
there-s-no-such-thing-as-judicial-supremacy-875527747603 (emphasis added).  The language in 
question begins at roughly the 1:03 mark. 
 27.  See WHITTINGTON, supra note 9, at 28–81. 
 28.  In each of these elections, either the president-elect secured a sizeable Electoral College 
majority (Jackson over Adams by a margin of 178 to 83; Lincoln at 180 versus his closest compet-
itor, Breckenridge, at 72; FDR over Hoover by a margin of 472 to 59; and Reagan over Carter by a 
comparable count of 489 to 49), or a narrower victory was supplemented by his party’s seizure of 
House and Senate majorities (Jefferson and his fellow Democratic-Republicans in the “Revolution 
of 1800”).  For the Electoral College figures from the 1828, 1860, 1932, and 1980 elections, see 
SIDNEY M. MILKIS & MICHAEL NELSON, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT, 1776–1993, at 460–464 (1994).  On the Jefferson-Adams tilt, see JAMES ROGER 
SHARP, THE DEADLOCKED ELECTION OF 1800: JEFFERSON, BURR, AND THE UNION IN THE 
BALANCE (2010). 
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posture.  Second, part of what facilitates a decisive electoral triumph in the 
first place is a “general political consensus that something fundamental ha[s] 
gone wrong in the high affairs of state.”29  When a presidential candidate 
loses the popular vote and only manages to secure an Electoral College tri-
umph by narrowly flipping three swing states from the previous election cy-
cle, there is reason to doubt that such a “consensus” exists. 
That would leave us, of course, with the preemptive leadership posture, 
or the “output” expected when the “inputs” are a strong regime and an in-
cumbent unaffiliated with it.  I will close this Essay by exploring the consti-
tutional import of Trump as a preemptive leader.  Before I do that, however, 
three points appear to be in order.  First, to classify the Republican incumbent 
in this manner would be to offer him the same classification as his Demo-
cratic predecessor.  Second, that result would hardly be at odds with Skow-
ronek’s understanding of the modern presidency (as outlined above).  Insofar 
as Obama and Trump have each militated (in their own way) against Wash-
ington’s “institutional universe,” they are perhaps the prophets of what 
Skowronek calls “Perpetual Preemption.”30  Finally, and most importantly, 
Skowronek reminds us that all unaffiliated leaders “test[] the resilience of the 
institutional infrastructure of the old order.”31  In classifying President Trump 
as a preemptive rather than reconstructive leader, then, I am merely guessing 
(or perhaps just hoping) that the strength of the current regime is sufficient 
to withstand the test that he has already begun to offer. 
* * * 
If Trump is, in fact, operating within a governing environment that is 
conducive to preemptive leadership, what does that portend for the short and 
long-term health of American constitutional democracy?  In the short term, 
if presidential history (coupled with Trump’s managerial style) is any guide, 
we should look for (1) the high drama of “de facto if not de jure” impeach-
ment, and (2) an attending vindication of constitutional principles.32  In the 
longer term, however, I fear that even an appropriate use (or near use) of the 
Constitution’s procedures for impeachment and removal, especially when 
coupled with the growing frequency of preemptive leadership, will only work 
to strengthen a “toxic political culture” that seems increasingly committed to 
deploying these “nuclear weapon[s] of American politics” as if they were 
conventional explosives.33 
                                                          
 29.  SKOWRONEK, supra note 7, at 37. 
 30.  See id. at 442. 
 31.  Id. at 45. 
 32.  Id. at 44. 
 33.  DAVID E. KYVIG, THE AGE OF IMPEACHMENT: AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE 
SINCE 1960, ix, 2 (2008). 
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Let me close by briefly expanding on these claims about the short- and 
long-term implications of Trump as a preemptive leader, beginning with the 
former.  In the first edition of The Politics Presidents Make, published in 
1993, Skowronek observed that three of the presidents who have skirted the 
bounds of impeachment, or actually inspired proceedingsJohn Tyler, An-
drew Johnson, and Richard Nixonall engaged in the politics of preemp-
tion.34  A revised edition of the book, published shortly after Bill Clinton’s 
second inauguration in early 1997, included a postscript in which Skowronek 
suggested that the 42nd president fell within the same category and warned 
of the “historic connection between preemptive leadership and constitutional 
crises.”35  Needless to say, we know how that story ended. 
The lesson here, of course, is that if Trump is in fact a preemptive leader, 
then he runs a higher-than-average risk of provoking real or de facto im-
peachment proceedings.  “Average” risk here flows from the fact that all in-
cumbents are liable to be impeached and removed from office for “egregious 
official conduct.”36  The first draft of this Essay was written as Trump’s ad-
ministration was reeling from (1) a Washington Post report that the president 
“revealed highly classified information to the Russian foreign minister and 
ambassador in a White House meeting” on May 10,37 and (2) a New York 
Times report that he asked then-FBI director James B. Comey to “shut down 
the federal investigation into . . . former national security adviser, Michael T. 
Flynn” on February 14.38  That draft was revised as the president faced in-
tense criticism for (1) encouraging National Football League owners to “fire” 
players who chose to protest police brutality and racial inequality by kneeling 
during the National Anthem,39 and (2) implying that Hurricane Maria was not 
a “real catastrophe” like Hurricane Katrina.40  Whether any of this conduct is 
sufficiently egregious to warrant impeachment and removal remains, of 
course, for the House and the Senate to decide.  Irrespective of Congress’s 
                                                          
 34.  SKOWRONEK, supra note 7.  
 35.  Id. at 464. 
 36.  Kyvig, supra note 33, at 30. 
 37.  Greg Miller & Greg Jaffe, Trump Revealed Highly Classified Information to Russian For-
eign Minister and Ambassador, WASH. POST (May 15, 2017), 
http://wapo.st/2pPSCIo?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.c0817bf32132. 
 38.  Michael S. Schmidt, Comey Memo Says Trump Asked Him to End Flynn Investigation, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2rnVVrw. 
 39.  Jeremy Gottlieb & Mark Maske, Roger Goodell Responds to Trump’s Call to ‘Fire’ NFL 
Players Protesting During National Anthem, WASH. POST. (Sept. 23, 2017), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2017/09/22/donald-trump-profanely-implores-nfl-owners-to-fire-
players-protesting-national-anthem/?utm_term=.6d17746a9d1b. 
 40.  Willa Frej & Marina Fang, Trump Downplays Puerto Rico’s Suffering, Says It’s Not A 
‘Real Catastrophe Like Katrina’, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/entry/trump-visits-puerto-rico_us_59d3640de4b0655781554854. 
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conclusions here, Trump’s status as a preemptive leader only works to en-
hance his risk profile.  Insofar as the president fancies himself a reconstruc-
tive leader, substantial challenges to the well-established ways of Washing-
ton may “ultimately galvanize[] it into an order-affirming defense of the 
government as it [is].”41  Real or de facto impeachment proceedings that flow 
from such challengesfor example, a serious presidential effort to decon-
struct the modern administrative state42—would represent a signal (to para-
phrase and repurpose Obama’s words from January 2009) that our system 
really cannot tolerate certain kinds of big plans.43 
As for the long-term implications of Trump as a preemptive leader, let 
us assume (at least for the moment) that Trump’s elevated risk of constitu-
tional drama translates into real or de facto impeachment proceedings in the 
near future (say, prior to January 2021).  Moreover, let us assume both that 
(1) these proceedings are justified, and (2) they yield a vindication of our 
constitutional principles (whether by the President’s resignation, his removal 
from office by the Senate, or his retention of the presidency coupled with 
appropriate behavioral change).  I am not at all certain that this scenario (and 
more particularly, its conclusion) would actually be cause for celebration.  
More to the point, I am concerned that it would portend both the extension 
and the strengthening of what the late historian David Kyvig called the “age 
of impeachment.” 
My concern here springs from the confluence of two trends within 
American politics.  The first involves a recent uptick in use of the Constitu-
tion’s impeachment and removal mechanisms.  Kyvig argued that these 
mechanisms have enjoyed “extraordinarily frequent use” since 1960use 
that rivals that of the entire period between 1789 and 1959.44  Without attrib-
uting the recent “slide in popular respect for government” entirely to “[t]he 
repeated experience of watching democratically chosen federal officials con-
sidered for impeachment[,]” he suggested that their role in that development 
“cannot be ignored.”45  If Kyvig is correct, then even justified proceedings 
                                                          
 41.  SKOWRONEK, supra note 7, at 44. 
 42.  David French, Trump Wants to Deconstruct the Regulatory State? Good. Here’s How You 
Start, NAT’L. REV. (Feb. 24, 2017), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/445226/administrative-
state-deconstruction-trump-steve-bannon-cpac. 
 43.  If I am overestimating the strength of the current “institutional universe,” however, then 
we will need to face Skowronek’s dark prophecy of a twenty-first-century president who “recall[s] 
the themes of past greatness and take[s] these as the marks of a truly great leader.”  This “great 
repudiator” would “fill the empty truisms of the classic reconstructive stance with a substance that 
seriously undermines the checks on power that the Constitution still affords.”  SKOWRONEK, supra 
note 7, at 442–43. 
 44.  Kyvig, supra note 33, at vii, 383. 
 45.  Id. at 403. 
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against our current president would reinforce this “culture of impeachment” 
and thus work to further erode popular respect for government.46 
A single incumbent, of course, can only reinforce a “culture of impeach-
ment” so much. But the second trend of interest herethe increasing fre-
quency of preemptive leadershippromises to supply American politics 
with a steady stream of presidents with higher-than-average risk of impeach-
ment and removal.  And if one or more of these future preemptors meet the 
same constitutional fate as Nixon, Clinton, and (for the sake of argument) 
Trump, then Kyvig’s “age of impeachment” promises to extend well into the 
twenty-first century.  More ominously, each successive employment (or near 
employment) of constitutional mechanisms designed for “extraordinary oc-
casions” will further condition us to think of them as ordinary tools.47  The 
point here, of course, is less to downplay the unique danger that Donald 
Trump may pose to the constitutional order and more to highlight the fact 
that the short-term “cure” provided by resignation, impeachment and re-
moval, or behavioral change under the threat of removal may also work to 
strengthen a longer-term “disease” of American constitutionalism. 
                                                          
 46.  Id. at 387. 
 47.  Id. at 2. 
